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Este estudio analiza la geografía del reemplazo de partidos durante el periodo 1994-
2000 en las ciudades más pobladas de México. Debatiendo estudios previos en otros 
países, este estudio demuestra que la difusión espacial de los partidos políticos en 
México no ha seguido una modalidad contagiosa, al menos para el caso del electorado 
urbano. También se muestra que el PAN y el PRD están concentrados 
geográficamente en algunas ciudades, pero rápidamente reemplazando al PRI por todo 




This study analyzes the geography of party replacement in the period 1994-2000 in the 
largest cities in Mexico. In disagreement with previous findings in other countries, this 
study shows that the spatial diffusion of political parties in Mexico has not followed a 
contagious diffusion fashion, at least for the case of the urban electorate. It is also 
shown that the PAN and the PRD are geographically concentrated in some cities, but 
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Introduction 
The spatial variation of voting behavior in Mexico has repeatedly revealed two 
patterns: urban/rural differences and regional electoral cleavages (Ames, 1970; 
Buendia, 2000; Butler, Pick and Jones, 1991; Klesner 1987, 1993, 1998; Molinar & 
Weldon, 1990; Reyna, 1971; Ramos, 1985; Story, 1987; Walton & Sween, 1971) 
Traditionally, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) old regime has received 
support from rural voters, whereas the non-PRI parties (Partido Accion Nacional , 
PAN, and Partido de la Revolucion Democratica, PRD) have received support from 
urban voters and remained spatially clustered in some regions. 
Dietz and Shidlo (1998) are correct when they state that Latin-Americanists 
have conducted few analyses of urban voters. The Mexican literature on the urban 
electorate has focused mostly in specific cities, usually Mexico City.  However, the 
urban electorate has rarely been studied across a sample of cities; only one nationwide 
analysis of urban electoral behavior in Mexico is available (Pacheco, 1997). 
Nevertheless, the urban electorate is fundamental to explain the rise of multiparty 
competition in Mexico.  
The urban electorate is not an homogeneous bloc. Electoral results show 
considerable variation within the Mexican system of cities. Some parties win in some 
cities, whereas other parties perform better in others. For example, in the 1997 
elections, the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) received 60% of the vote in Tepatitlan, 
Jalisco, but only 2% in Cardenas, Tabasco. The Partido de la Revolucion Democratica   3
(PRD) received 62% of the vote in Cardenas, Tabasco, but only 4% in Puerto Vallarta, 
Jalisco. In contrast, the PRI had its highest level of support with 58% of the vote in 
Saltillo, Coahuila and its lowest level with 23% in Cajeme, Sonora -- a more uniform 
level of support across urban areas.  
Also, between the 1994 and the 2000 federal representative elections, non-PRI 
parties such as the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and Partido de la Revolucion 
Democratica (PRD) received an enormous increase in support from urban voters. In 
1994, the PRI won the majority in 81 of the 89 largest cities. In 2000, it won the 
majority in only 19 cities. The rest of the cities were distributed between the PAN and 
the PRD (see Table 1). In this period, voting behavior in Mexican major cities 
displayed the typical pattern of spatial clustering but also a geographic process of 
party replacement. 
Table 1. Cities Where a Political Party Obtained the Majority of the Vote in the 
1994, 1997 and 2000 Federal Representative Elections.* 
Party 1994  1997  2000 
PAN  5 28  59 
PRI  81 41  19 
PRD  3 20  11 
Total  89 89  89 
a. For year 2000 PAN became Alianza por el Cambio; Coalition of Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and 
Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM). PRD became Alianza por Mexico: Coalition of Partido 
de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD), Partido del Trabajo (PT), Convergencia, Partido de la Sociedad 
Nacionalista (PSN), and Partido Accion Social (PAS). The three latter parties were created just before 
the 2000 elections. 
* Cities with 100,000 inhabitants or more in 1995 (n = 89). 
Source: IFE 2001; author's calculations 
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Several scholars have debated the reasons for these patterns. Some argue that 
the local context of the voter does not matter (McAllister, 1987; McAllister & Studlar, 
1992). Rather, they propose that the spatial variation in voting behavior is caused by 
the aggregate effect of socioeconomic characteristics that happen to covary with 
location. This proposition is often called the components-effect explanation. This 
proposition suggests that the electorate can be analyzed as one national group whose 
behavior is not place specific. 
Other scholars (mostly geographers) argue the opposite, that local context 
matters (Agnew, 1987; Burbank, 1995; Cox, 1969, 1987; Flint, 1995; Johnston, 
Shelley & Taylor, 1990; Johnston, 1991; O'Louhglin & Anselin, 1991). Specifically, 
they say that voting behavior varies across places independently of the compositional 
characteristics of the population in the location where the voters live. This proposition 
has two implications. One, social phenomena occurring in the local context such as the 
local economic conditions and the local political issues, have effect on the voters 
(Cox, 1987). Two, the electorate should not be studied as a homogeneous group across 
the nation (Flint, 1995). Its analysis requires a place-specific approach. 
In addition to the local-contextual-effect debate, evidence of party replacement 
processes also suggests that information on electoral choices undergoes a diffusion 
process (Flint, 1995). Previous studies have found that political parties spread 
contagiously; in other words, they depend on physical proximity (Flint, 1995; Lutz, 
1995). The considerable increase in support for non-PRI parties in Mexican urban   5
areas between 1994 and 2000, suggests the operation of a spatial diffusion process of 
political information. 
Even though new parties seemed to have successfully sent their messages to 
many cities, it is not known if their support spread in a contagious pattern. Our 
knowledge of the causes for the spatial clustering in voting behavior and the 
geographical replacement of old political parties by new ones is limited and invites 
several questions: Does the local urban context matter? Or does the aggregate 
socioeconomic composition of cities explain this spatial clustering? How do new 
political parties diffuse across space? Certainly, the PAN and PRD spread to new 
cities and supplant the PRI. But did this spread follow a contagious diffusion process? 
Or was it rather a national trend where place and distance was irrelevant? This 
“spatial” approach, through the testing of geographical theories of diffusion, can help 
to explain why the PRI has lost power in favor to the PAN and the PRD. 
This paper focuses on large urban areas electoral behavior also since rural and 
small urban areas have remained generally in favor for the PRI (58%, 47% and 50% in 
the 1994, 1997, and 2000 elections respectively); it has been in large and medium size 
cities where electoral changes and party replacement have mostly happened. 
 
The Mexican electoral context of the late nineties 
It is important to interpret election results in the cultural and historical context 
of the country and region where they take place (Agnew, 1990; Basañez, 1995). For   6
that reason, some feasible explanations for these geographical processes can be found 
by attending to (1) the national context of the elections, (2) the regional electoral 
loyalties, and (3) the role of the mass media in spreading information on rising 
political parties. 
In this sense, the 1997 and especially the 2000 Federal elections made history 
in Mexico for the magnitude of the PRI electoral breakdown. Never had the PRI 
suffered such electoral losses, ones that, by the way, are said to have brought evidence 
of Mexico's transition to democracy (Rodriguez, 1998). Academics have offered two 
contextual explanations for the results of this election: 
1.  The product of a new civic culture and credible elections in Mexico 
(Bailey & Valenzuela, 1997; Rodriguez, 1998). 
2.  The effect of economic crisis and structural government corruption 
(Blum, 1997). 
Rodriguez (1998) claims that the rise of non-PRI parties in urban local 
elections is due to the development of a new civic culture. Specifically, she says that 
electoral reforms have created a new civic culture that demands government 
accountability and electoral processes transparency. In this regard, Schedler (2000) 
mentions that until the early 1990s the PRI political regime was notorious for electoral 
fraud, but that things are different today as a consequence of electoral reforms. Pastor 
(2000) presents the results of a survey of voters conducted before the 1988 elections, 
where 87% of the respondents did not believe that the PRI regime would respect the   7
final results. But Bailey and Valenzuela (1997) believe that having credible results 
allow voters to consider other political alternatives than the PRI, so that party 
realignments can occur.  
Blum (1997) interprets the PRI’s electoral losses in 1997 as the combined 
effect of the 1995 economic crisis and structural corruption. He argues that the 1997 
electoral realignment was just the starting stage of a larger political process: "… we 
may be witnessing the birth of a competitive multiparty political system" (p. 28). His 
main argument is that in Mexico key political changes have occurred only when 
"…(1) a period of economic growth and rising social expectations has been interrupted 
by a severe economic crisis affecting the population's personal welfare; (2) an 
impression of the weakness, corruption, and incompetence of what appears to be a 
hopelessly doomed government grips the general public and the intelligentsia; and (3) 
the ruling elite becomes irreparably divided over its perceptions of basic interests or 
issues" (Blum, 1997, pp. 28-29). Lawson (1997) agrees with the previous 
explanations. He says "political reform, civic mobilization, and public disgust over 
corruption and economic mismanagement all contributed to the PRI's defeat"  (p. 13). 
These political and economic conditions reflect the context of the 1997 and 
2000 elections. In 1995 Mexico experienced its worst economic crisis of the 20
th 
century. The GDP decreased by 7% and manufacturing industry by 8%; and the 
negative economic effects were felt mostly by the poor (Fuchs, 2001). The PRI regime   8
was perceived as incapable of maintaining order in the political process and promoting 
economic growth (Blum, 1997).  
Regarding regional loyalties, it is important to consider that both the North and 
Bajio regions have historically been strongholds for the PAN. There are records of 
intense electoral opposition to the PRI in the Bajio since the 1940s and victories for 
the PAN in some cities since the 1960s (Rionda, 2000). Actually, since 1989 and 1991 
respectively, the PAN has been the governing party in the state of Baja California and 
Guanajuato. The current Mexican President Vicente Fox was governor of Guanajuato 
state before winning the presidential election in 2000.  
 
Figure 1. Map of Mexico´s Regions* 
          * Based on Klesner´s Electoral Alignment and the New Party System in Mexico. Paper 
presented at the 1998 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association. Chicago, IL.    9
 
These historical patterns confirm the existence of regional loyalties to the 
PAN. Brustein (1988) comments that "where a party best reflects the local interests 
there is where it will receive the strongest support" (p. 71). In this sense, the context of 
the North and Bajio regions can be defined as traditional by Mexican standards. The 
Bajio is particularly an area historically identified with strong Catholic values and 
political conservatism. For example, the Cristeros (soldiers of Christ) rebellion of 
1927 in the Bajio was a consequence of regional opposition to the Mexican federal 
government’s anti-Catholic church position at that time.  Religious conservatism is 
still strong and influences the local political agenda. One example is offered by Shirk 
(2000) who comments that in Guanajuato (in the heart of the Bajio region), laws have 
been proposed by the PAN majority in the local congress to ban abortion even in cases 
of rape. This political position would be difficult to sell in Mexico City, which 
contains a more left-wing (PRD profile) electorate.  
In terms of access to electoral information, Schedler (2000) states that the 
electoral reforms of 1996 "did much to level the electoral playing field, equalizing 
parties' access to financial resources by combining generous public funding with strict 
limits on private financing, realistic campaign-spending ceilings, rigorous accounting 
requirements and close Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) oversight of party finance" 
(p. 11).  
According to the theory of the rational voter, voting decisions require the 
possession of political information (Iversen, 1994). The theory predicts that voters   10
decide which political party they are going to vote for only after they know what each 
party is offering. In Mexico, one consequence of federal electoral reforms has been 
access to greater financial resources by new parties for their campaigns. According to 
Olson and Freeman (2000), in 1994 political parties spent about 25% of their 
campaign funds on radio and TV advertisements; in 1997, that figure rose to 56%.  
In Mexico, television is a key source of political information for the voter 
(Olson & Freeman, 2000). Before the 1990s, mass media was considered to favor the 
PRI over other political parties (Lawson, 1997). According to Lawson, every election 
before 1997 the PRD had been systematically excluded from broadcast-media 
channels. For the 1997 elections however, this author considers that the Mexican mass 
media had grown more pluralistic. For example, "while the PRI commanded 88% of 
television time devoted to the 1988 presidential campaign and 51% in 1994, 
preliminary counts suggest that its 1997 share fell to 23%” (p. 15). Apparently, 
electoral reforms allowed non-PRI parties to spread their message and "to compete on 
a roughly equal footing with the PRI" (p. 13). Overall, fairness in access to mass 
media has been encouraged by increases in public funding for campaign and the 
privatization of media networks (Lawson, 1997).  
But, from our spatial approach, did television make space and distance 
irrelevant? There is theoretical debate in this regard: Stephens (1995) has argued that 
the spread of political information is constrained by distance. On the other hand, 
Harvey (1989) comments that the current proliferation of new technologies of mass   11
communication surpasses space, and Urry (1997) comments that instantaneity in the 
transmission of information today puts places in a global context.  
 
Theoretical perspectives on the spatial clustering and diffusion of electoral 
behavior 
The spatial variation of voting behavior has been explained from two different 
theoretical perspectives: Component effects vs. local contextual effects.  
In support for the component effects perspective, McAllister and Studlar 
(1992) have argued for the British case that regional voting is a "functional rather than 
a territorial division" (p. 175), that is, regional variation in voting behavior is a 
consequence of aggregate socioeconomic differences. The local context does not 
influence voter attitudes in Britain (McAllister, 1987). This is often called the 
compositional effects perspective (Agnew, 1987). In consequence, this perspective 
suggests that similar people vote similarly, independently of their location 
(McAllister, 1987; McAllister & Studlar, 1992). This implies that the electorate can be 
studied as a national unit, not necessarily regionally (Stokes, 1967). Its theoretical 
framework is the nationalization theory, which is based on modernization theory 
premises (Agnew, 1987). The main proposition is that place or local context, as an 
explanatory variable is only important in traditional societies, not in modern ones.  
One effect of modernization is urbanization, which in Mexico is a major factor 
for explaining spatial variations in voting behavior (Klesner, 1993, 1998; Molinar &   12
Weldon, 1990). Deutsch and Huntington  (cited in Dietz & Shidlo, 1998) have also 
suggested the importance of urbanization in Latin America for explaining social 
mobilization processes. They have argued that cities are by their nature more political 
than rural areas because urban residents are exposed to higher levels of political 
stimuli such as political parties, social movements, media etc. (Deutsch, 1961; 
Huntington, 1991).  
On the other hand, the local contextual effects argument is that social and 
political interests in specific places can be different from national trends (Agnew, 
1987). These interests may shape patterns of voting behavior independently of the 
aggregate socioeconomic characteristics of the population. Specifically, the local 
context is understood as the interaction between an individual and his or her 
environment "with the nature of the environment being constructed over time in part 
by the actors" (Flint, 1998; p. 1293). 
The local context perspective rests upon Gidden's structuration theory. This 
theory mainly states that human agency and structure affect each other. On one side, 
agency is influenced by "traditions, institutions, moral codes and established ways of 
doing things" (Giddens & Pierson, 1998, p. 77). On the other, individuals transform 
structures either by ignoring, replacing, or reproducing them differently across time 
and space. 
The local environment has long believed to have an effect on political behavior 
(Agnew, 1987; Burbank, 1995; Cox, 1969; Flint, 1995; Johnston, Shelley & Taylor,   13
1990; Johnston, 1991; O'Loughlin & Anselin, 1991). Briefly, it is argued that people 
in similar socioeconomic circumstances may vote differently depending on where they 
live. Individuals are constantly exposed to social stimuli, and they make use of the 
information derived from the local social environment when making political 
decisions (Burbank, 1995). 
Cities as places also exercise a contextual effect on voters. Saurzopf and 
Swanstrom (1999) analyzed electoral behavior in a sample of U.S. metropolitan areas 
and concluded that it is critical to study the metropolis as a place that has "political 
transformative effects" on voters, since different places create different political 
attitudes and electoral behaviors (p. 88). Specifically, local contextual effects may 
occur as of "social networks, sources of information and reference to groups rooted in 
places" (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999, p. 87).  
The effects of local campaigning in urban Mexico have started to be 
geographically analyzed. For example, Tejera (2000) studied the 1997 vote in 
Iztapalapa, a working class area of Mexico City, and found that the PRI campaign was 
directed to those areas and individuals with an established relationship with the party. 
In terms of the effects of local contextual issues, he found that changes in the vote 
were related to changes in legislation related to public housing. 
With regards to the spatial diffusion perspective, Tobler (1970) stated that 
"everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant 
things” (p. 236). Based on this perspective, scholars have argued that collective   14
behavior is capable of spreading across places independently of socioeconomic change 
(Agnew, 1987). According to Hagerstrand (1966), the spread process of new ideas and 
behaviours is likely to be contagious, thus producing a kind of spatial effect where 
social phenomena spread out based on physical contiguity and proximity. Some 
examples are voting behavior (Flint, 1995; Lutz, 1990), fertility (Tolnay, 1995), and 
church membership (Land, Deane & Blau, 1991). 
Spatial diffusion is typically neither uniform nor instantaneous (Lowe and 
Moryadas, 1975). For example, a diffusion process of support for new political parties 
may not be spatially random, but present higher levels of support near the source 
(where the party was supported in the previous election). Lutz (1990, 1995) studied 
nationalist parties in Wales, Scotland and Italy in the 1980s and 1990s and found that 
their support diffused in a contagious fashion: New voting support was statistically 
related to neighboring areas of previous support. This finding agrees with Stephens’ 
(1981) study of the Swedish electorate, which concluded that the spread of political 
ideas and realignment is dependent on distance.  
These findings support the relevance of the local contextual perspective since 
they give us evidence of spatial variation in the diffusion of electoral behavior that is 
independent of the spatial clustering of aggregate socioeconomic characteristics. They 
also contradict the nationalization thesis because voters in similar places behaved 
differently. 
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Voting Covariates in Mexico 
The majority of the ecological studies in Mexico have been mainly grounded in 
modernization theory although only some make specific mention of it (e.g., Butler, 
Pick & Jones 1991; Klesner, 1993, 1998; Peschard, 1988; Reyna, 1971). The use of 
variables related to urbanization and industrialization makes reference to the view that 
the modernization process --the transition from a traditional non-democratic society 
into a multiparty and competitive political system-- is a consequence of the 
transformation of economic organization. In other words, the modernization of the 
economy, in a Western direction, brings a change in political practices, including 
electoral preferences.  
In terms of the units of analysis, cross-sectional studies of Mexican states are 
the most numerous in the literature (Ames, 1970; Reyna, 1971; Ramos, 1985; Klesner, 
1987; Story, 1987; Butler, Pick and Jones, 1991), followed by case studies of Mexico 
City (Davis and Coleman, 1982; Molinar & Valdes, 1987; Peschard, 1997; Tarres, 
1988), electoral districts (Molinar & Weldon, 1990; Klesner, 1993), the national 
electorate as one unit (Buendia, 2000; Dominguez & McCann, 1995) and municipios 
(Klesner, 1998; Walton & Sween, 1971). In most cases, federal elections are analyzed 
and only a few studies (Miron, 1998; Molinar & Valdes, 1985) have paid attention to 
local elections. 
Only one study has analyzed electoral outcomes across urban areas. Pacheco 
(1997) compared the results of the 1988, 1991, and 1994 congressional elections in the   16
200 most populated municipios (all of them urban areas) in the country and found that 
the territorial distribution of the vote for the three major national parties (PAN, PRI, 
and PRD) was not homogeneous.  
In terms of the findings, there is general agreement that urbanization and 
industrialization are useful predictors of voting behavior especially for non-PRI 
parties. Urbanization has been operationalized mostly based on population size and 
industrialization as population employed in the manufacturing industry. 
Also region makes a significant difference (Dominguez and McCann, 1995; 
Klesner 1993, 1998; Molinar & Weldon, 1990; Story, 1987). The PAN has been 
supported in the north and the center of the country, whereas the PRI has been evenly 
supported throughout the nation but especially in the south. The PRD and other left-
wing parties have been favored in the center and southwest in some elections and very 
often and strongly in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. The PRI has been and still 
is the only party competing nationwide; most other parties compete in a few regions.  
The underlying reason for these regional differences can be explained contextually. As 
mentioned before, there is a history in Mexico of regional loyalty in some regions and 
cities. 
Income is the most common variable used as an indicator of social class. It has 
been detected to be a significant aggregate data predictor of the vote for all the parties 
in Mexico. Specifically, it has been found that poorer people favor the PRI and richer   17
people favor the PAN (Klesner, 1987, 1998; Ramos, 1985; Reyna, 1971; Tarres, 
1996).  
Occupation has been used as a proxy for social class (Dominguez & McCann, 
1995; Reyna, 1971). There are some contradictions in the literature in this respect. For 
example, Dominguez and McCann (1995) found no evidence of statistical significance 
for the professional class as a predictor in the 1988 and 1991 federal elections. In their 
study, a wide set of occupations represent the professional class --any job that requires 
a college degree. On the other hand, Butler, Pick, and Jones (1991) found that in the 
1988 elections, occupation (agricultural, construction, managerial, service, 
unemployment included) had a significant effect in shaping electoral outcomes. 
Similar conclusions were reached previously by Reyna (1971). He found that for the 
1952-1967 period jobs that require a college degree (managerial and professional), or 
other jobs not related to agriculture, significantly related to a preference for non-PRI 
parties. Bureaucrats seemed to support the PRI, while the unemployed supported the 
PRD (Klesner, 1998). Measurements of education also show that higher levels 
increase the propensity to vote for the PAN and decreases the preference for the PRI. 
This variable is said to have a positive effect on the PRD (Dominguez & McCann, 
1995; Klesner, 1998). However, according to P e s c h a r d  ( 1 9 9 7 )  t h i s  va r i a b l e  i s  n o t  
significant either. 
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One exception to the class-voting hypothesis is Peschard's (1997) claim that 
votes for PRD cannot be determined by social class. According to her, the PRD is a 
party that crosses social classes. It should be noted that her study was specific to 
Mexico City, which is a place with a local history of support for non-PRI political 
parties. 
In terms or religion, even though it is commonly thought that the PAN attracts 
the Catholic vote, this conclusion should be taken with caution. Depending upon the 
operationalization of the variable, diverging conclusions can be reached. While 
Klesner (1993, 1998), using aggregate data from the Census, consistently finds a 
statistically significant correlation of Catholicism with voting for the PAN, 
Dominguez and McCann (1995), using survey data and asking questions more about 
religiosity, found church-goers did not favor the PAN, whereas they did tend to vote 
for the PRI and not for the PRD. 
Religious self-definition on the census is a nominal category. Many people 
who were baptized Catholic might just check off "Catholic" on the form, but they may 
not be active church-goers. Therefore, the use of census data does not permit a 
measure of the true relationship between religious faith and party preference. Other 
problems arise with this variable. For example, non-Catholics are most numerous in 
southern Mexico, making the region itself an intervening or confounding variable to a 
certain degree. This methodological problem with the use of spatial data is related to 
the previous theoretical discussion on local contextual effects and voting behavior.   19
To sum up, these studies document the spatial variation of the vote, the 
existence of regional and social cleavages, and the urban nature of votes for non-PRI 
parties. The contradictory conclusions in terms of the direction of the effects are 
related to the operationalization of variables and to the source of the information; 
surveys or census data. Nevertheless, the literature shows broad agreement that 
different aggregate population characteristics in different places can predict aggregate 
voting results. 
 
Methodology: testing theories of spatial variation and diffusion in Mexico 
The statistical analysis of ecological data has two methodological implications 
(O'Loughlin & Anselin, 1992): spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity. Spatial 
dependence exists when "the value of the dependent variable in one spatial unit of 
analysis is partially a function of the value of the same variable in neighboring units" 
(Flint, Harrower & Edsall, 2000, p. 4). This interaction relates to the issue of spatial 
autocorrelation; a clustering of similar values on the map. Spatial heterogeneity refers 
to the variation in relationships across space (Lesage, 1999). The methodological 
implication in ordinary least squares (OLS) methods is that statistical inferences will 
be misleading due to heteroskedasticity (Anselin, 1988). Failure to detect it can result 
in inefficient parameter estimates and inflated estimates of standard errors (Anselin, 
1988). The most widely used technique for the detection of spatial autocorrelation is   20
Moran's I (1950). A test for spatial dependence of the residuals can be included in 
regression analysis. 
The study uses three dependent variables -- the vote for each party (PAN, 
PRD, PRI) in the 2000 elections; in three separate regression models. These models 
include causal variables to test for the existence of local contextual effects and 
contagious diffusion, after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables 
(component effects). 
As previously mentioned, variables associated with urbanization and 
industrialization have seemed capable of predicting spatial variation in voting 
behavior in Mexico since the first studies in the 1970s (See Table 2). These variables 
have been classified in the Mexican literature as "classic" for detecting aggregate 
voting behavior (Molinar & Weldon, 1990). 
A control variable is the regional dummy, since Mexican parties have been 
shown to possess strong regional bases (Klesner, 1998). The purpose for including this 
control variable in the model is to detect regional variation, spatial heterogeneity, and 
the existence of contextual effects. The definition of region is the same as in Klesner's 
(1998) study of Mexican electoral behavior. This approach also permits us to detect 
the presence of spatial heterogeneity in the data. This study incorporates a test on the 
contagious diffusion hypothesis by adding a temporal-spatial lag. This temporal-
spatial lag is the average value of the vote for a party in neighboring cities in 1994.   21
The logic behind this approach is that, hypothetically,  information flows are a 
function of distance (Stephens, 1981). 
The geographical location of each city is given by the coordinates of the 
centroid for each city. For the computation of the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, 
neighbors are predefined based on distance from the centroid. The minimum distance 
considered for the computation of the autocorrelation coefficient is 330 kilometers 
(263 miles) which is the minimum distance in which all cities in the sample have at 
least one neighbor. The distance considered for the regression models is 330 
kilometers (263 miles) as well. The average number of neighbour cities is 14. 
 
Table 2. Dependent and independent variables in the analysis. 
Dependent variable  Description 
Voting  support  Vote for each party (PAN, PRD, PRI) in the 2000 
elections (percentage of the total vote) 











Population size by 100,000 (2000) 
% who speak Indian language (2000) 
% lived in other state in 1995 (2000) 
% manufacturing workers (2000) 
% > 15 yrs. old read and write (2000) 
% > 10 daily minimum wages (2000) 
% Catholic (2000) 
Average value of the vote for each party in neighboring 
cities in the 1994 election 
5 regions (Central, North, Bajio Center West, Mexico 
City Metropolitan Area, and South) 
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This study utilizes a group of the 89 cities that in 1997 had 100,000 or more 
inhabitants. Cities may be conformed by one or more municipios. I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  
municipio (227) data was aggregated to the urban scale for this purpose. The reason 
for the population threshold is to study cities comparable in size. Mexico does not 
have an official definition of city; however, the Mexican National Population Council 
(CONAPO) has defined the cities and metropolitan areas used in this study.  
The source for socioeconomic information is the National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Informatics in Mexico (INEGI). The socioeconomic data at 
the municipio level for 2000 is available on the Web. Electoral Outcomes for 1994 and 
1997 federal elections are available also on the Web from the Federal Electoral 
Institute in Mexico (IFE).  
The procedure in this study has two steps. The first is to test the hypothesis of 
spatial dependence, that electoral results in one city depended on results in nearby 
cities. The second is to test if this spatial autocorrelation can be explained by either 
"composition effects" or "place effects”, and if the spread of the vote for the various 
political parties followed a contagious diffusion process. 
 
Results of the Analysis 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part presents the results of the 
spatial clustering analysis. The second presents the results of the tests for local 
contextual effects and contagious diffusion hypotheses.   23
a) Spatial clustering 
The results in Table 3 show evidence of positive significant autocorrelation, 
confirming that voting behavior in urban areas is spatially clustered. This political 
phenomenon exemplifies the first law of geography that "everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things" (Tobler, 1970, p. 
236). This finding also expands previous results in Mexican literature showing that 
there are urban clusters of voting preferences. 
 
Table 3. Values of Moran I correlation coefficient for each political party by year 
and by buffer zone. 






PAN     
1994  0.167** 0.086** 0.030** 
1997  0.199** 0.044** 0.022** 
2000a 0.072*  -0.034  -0.024 
PRI     
1994 0.020  -0.006  -0.020 
1997 0.225**  0.076**  -0.023 
2000 0.251**  0.082**  0.003 
PRD     
1994  0.193** 0.095** 0.052** 
1997 0.155**  0.039**  0.008* 
2000b 0.069*  0.016  0.007* 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test) 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) 
a. Alianza por el Cambio; Coalition of Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and Partido Verde Ecologista de 
Mexico (PVEM) 
b. Alianza por Mexico: Coalition of Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD), Partido del Trabajo 
(PT), Convergencia, Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista (PSN), and Partido Accion Social (PAS). The 
three latter parties were created just befote the 2000 elections.   24
c. Coefficients were calculated for buffer areas below 330 kms radius. Results showed higher levels of 
spatial autocorrelation for smaller buffer areas. 





A coefficient value of 1 indicates perfect positive spatial autocorrelation, 
meaning that similar voting results, either high or low are spatially clustered. A value 
of -1 indicates perfect negative spatially autocorrelation, meaning that voting results 
are perfectly dispersed across space (like black and white colors in a chessboard). A 
value of zero indicates an absence of spatial arrangement: a geographically random 
display.  
The coefficient was calculated for 3 different buffer zones so that the effect of 
different area definitions of nearby cities could be observed. An increase in the buffer 
zone size implies an increase in the number of neighboring places. The results shown 
in Table 3 indicate that the strength of the association decreased for all parties as the 
radius of the buffer zone increased. Again, this finding validates Tobler's first law of 
geography. As applied to this research, the law states that as we expand the 
geographical area within which the levels of spatial dependence are calculated, the 
level of clustering in our variable of interest will tend to decrease, since its spatial 
variation will tend to increase (distant things are less related). 
Results for the PAN in the 1994 and 1997 elections are positively 
autocorrelated, meaning that the vote for this party was spatially clustered; results in 
one city were associated with similar results in neighboring cities. There was an   25
increase in the strength of the association between 1994 and 1997, indicating a process 
of geographical concentration. However, this pattern changed for the 2000 election. 
The main reason was the PAN coalition with the PVEM which is also clustered but in 
other cities (Mexico City, Salamanca, and Orizaba) causing a change in its geography 
of the vote. Also, this process suggests a trend of rising national predominance. 
Spatial patterns for the PRI are distinctive. Voting behavior in 1994 showed no 
pattern of clustering, but it did for 1997 and 2000. The reason is that spatial 
distribution of the vote for the PRI in the first election was uniform across the country. 
It received very similar levels of voting support everywhere: 40 to 60% of the total 
vote in 72 cities (81% of the sample). For the 2000 election the situation was 
completely different. The PRI lost support notably and in a geographic pattern; its 
urban support became more concentrated around certain cities.  
The urban vote for the PRD also exhibited a pattern of spatial clustering. 
Between 1994 and 2000 the strength of the spatial association decreased suggesting a 
process of geographical decentralization.  
Spatial pattern findings in this part offer preliminary evidence of spatial effects 
or spillovers of political behavior between cities. However, they are only tentative 
because the causes are not known. A spatial association between voting behavior and 
the socioeconomic composition of the population could explain the spatial 
autocorrelation in our dependent variable.    26
Also, as mentioned previously, a contagious diffusion test requires an 
autoregressive approach, which considers the spatial lag of the dependent variable as a 
regressor. With the aim of detecting the nature and causes of these findings, a spatial 
regression analysis was performed. This test is described in the following section. 
 
b) The Local Context and the Contagious Diffusion 
As was previously explained, spatial models allow the researcher to identify 
causal variables of spatial variation and simultaneously test the contagious diffusion 
hypothesis.  Table 4 shows the spatial regression results for the PAN, the PRI, and the 
PRD. None of the models show spatial autocorrelation in the residuals. In other words, 
the spatial autocorrelation problem in linear regression modeling has been resolved, 
and the model does not require further independent variables. In this sense, the 
inclusion of the temporal-spatial-temporal lag as an autoregressive solution is actually 
not necessary for the correction of the model. However, since we are also interested in 
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Table 4. Spatial lag regression results for PAN-PVEM coalition, PRI and PRD-6 
coalition voting behavior (2000). 
Variable PAN-PVEM  PRI  PRD-6 
Constant -0.484**  1.105**  0.817** 
Socioeconomic     
Population size
a 0.000  0.000  0.000* 
Catholicism -0.013  -0.510**  0.441** 
Literacy 1.204**  -0.284  -1.472** 
Manufacturing 0.595**  0.003  -0.468** 
Income 5.918**  2.609  -5.344** 
Ethnicity 0.698**  0.039  -0.764** 
Migration -0.289  -1.008**  0.592 
Context effect
c     
North 0.089*  0.067*  0.088** 
Bajio  0.118** 0.025 -0.087** 
Metro  -0.007 0.015 -0.037 
South -0.015  -0.011  0.108** 
Diffusion  effect     
Temporal-Spatial  Lag  0.034 -0.421 0.109 
Regression diagnostics
 b 
















** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test) 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) 
aThere is a value after 4 ceros. 
b Probability in parentheses 
c The region of reference is Center: Mexico City and the state of Mexico 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (n = 89) 
 
For the PAN, several voting covariates show statistical significance. 
Particularly, higher levels of literacy, manufacturing, income, and ethnicity are 
positively correlated with PAN voting in our sample of cities. Unexpectedly,   28
catholicism did not serve as predictor, whereas ethnicity did have a positive effect. 
These new findings can be partially explained based on the changing geography 
resulting from its coalition with the PVEM. The PAN in coalition with the PVEM 
capitalized considerably in  cities such as Salamanca, Guanajuato (+ 38%) and 
Orizaba, Veracruz (+ 25%). 
Two regional contextual variables, Bajio and North, are positive and 
statistically significant for the PAN, indicating that these variables have independent 
explanatory importance. In other words, these regions continue to explain some of the 
variance in the vote after controlling for the other voting covariates. It follows that 
there must be a regional preference for the PAN since it overperformed in the Bajio 
and North regions after the spatial autocorrelation in the residuals was accounted for, 
meaning that the effect cannot be a consequence of mispecification of the model. 
Historically these two regions have been strongholds for the PAN. There is no 
evidence of either multicollinearity or heteroskedasticity problems. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistical test on the spatial residuals suggests a normal distribution (KS = 
.588 n.s).  
For the PRI, The model reveals Catholicism and migration as the only 
significant variables correlated with PRI 2000 voting after controlling for the other 
covariates. Both are negatively correlated.    29
It was considered useful to compute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in 
order to prevent potential multicollinearity problems.
1 Results do not show any 
independent variable exceeding the general VIF rule of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 
1980). We also checked for violations on the homoskedasticity (constant variance 
across predicted values) assumption. Additionally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 
test on the spatial residuals shows them to be normally distributed (KS = .617, n.s.).
2 
The model tested ideal for linear fit as our spatial diagnostics show; the spatial error 
terms were independent and normally distributed. 
For the PRI, only the North contextual effect variable (regional dummy) 
showed statistical significance, which is another finding different from previous 
studies. Historically, the PRI has not been associated with any particular region; it was 
the only truly national party. This finding is in accordance to the increasing levels of 
spatial clustering for this party and the loss of its national dominance (see tables 3 and 
1 respectively). Between 1994 and 2000, the PRI increased its vote in only 7 cities, 
particularly in the northern cities of Piedras Negras, Coahuila (+ 12%), Los Mochis, 
Sinaloa (+ 8%), and Culiacan, Sinaloa ( + 7%).  
In regard to the contagious diffusion hypothesis, the non-significance of the 
temporal spatial lag suggests its rejection. No relationship between electoral results in 
                                                      
1 VIF values were calculated using the SPSS software. R
2 and F values were also obtained using the 
SPSS software. The S-Plus extension for ArcView unstandardized ordinary least square estimates were 
comparable to SPSS.  
2 The null hypothesis in this test is no difference between the actual distribution of the residuals and a 
normal distribution. 
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2000 and previous results in neighboring cities was found. After statistical controls 
were set, earlier support in nearby cities was inconsequential for explaining variation 
in electoral behavior. 
As with the other two parties, the PRD compositional model accounts for the 
spatial autocorrelation of the residuals, suggesting that the model has the necessary 
independent variables for explaining the spatial clustering. Once again, neither 
heteroskedasticity nor multicollinearity seem to be present. Spatial residuals show a 
normal distribution (KS = ..868 n.s.). 
Several socioeconomic factors are important for the PRD. For instance, it 
performed better in cities with lower levels of literacy, manufacturing workers, 
income, and ethnicity. Yet, in contrast with past elections, in the 2000 elections the 
PRD performed better in cities with higher levels of Catholicism (see Table 4). This 
finding should be taken cautiously. This statistical result is actually effect of two 
regional dummies, Bajio and North, as intervening variables in the model (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986). Several tests were conducted, and it was detected that it was only after 
regional controls were utilized, catholicism would become a positive significant 
predictor for the PRD.  
Another difference with previous studies are the North and South regional 
dummies as favorable for this party. Interestingly, the PRD showed a considerable 
increase in its support in some northern cities such as La Paz, Baja California Sur (+ 
33%), Fresnillo, Zacatecas (+ 31%), Zacatecas, Zacatecas (+ 27%), and Durango,   31
Durango (+ 8%), the latter city as a consequence of its alliance with the PT for which 
there is local history of previous support. Nevertheless, the PRD has also been strong 
in a few northern cities such as Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas, Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas, 
and Ciudad Obregon, Sonora. In the south, the PRD has been traditionally strong in 
cities such as Cardenas, Michoacan, Apatzingan, Michoacan, Iguala, Guerrero, and 
Cardenas, Tabasco. On the opposite side, the Bajio region has been and still is 
unsupportive. The PRD always underperform there after voting covariates have been 
accounted for. This constant finding confirms the existence of a contextual effect and 
a historical geography of exclusion between the PAN and the PRD in the Bajio region. 
The contagious diffusion hypothesis should be rejected for this party as well. 
The temporal spatial lag did not show statistical significance, indicating that electoral 
results in 2000 were not related to the results in 1994  in nearby cities.  
To verify previous findings, spatial regression for smaller buffers (100 & 200 
kms.)  were conducted for all parties. Spatial autocorrelation in the residuals was 
found not significant for all parties , yet regional effects were significant for the PRD 
only. Basically, regional effects tended to disappear as buffers became smaller (except 
for the PRD) meaning that region as an explanatory variable gained/lost importance 
for the PRI and the PAN upon its areal definition. Regional sentiments remained for 
the PRD, reinforcing the validity of the regional/local contextual hypothesis. 
In addition, spatial regressions were conducted for these small buffers but this 
time not including the regional dummies. It was found that spatial autocorrelation in   32
the residuals would show no statistical significance either. Thus, it follows that the 
variable region is capturing variation beyond the socioeconomic composition of the 
population. Some parties over/underperform in some regions independently of the 
previous statistical controls. Historically speaking, this finding makes complete sense 
for the PAN in the Bajio region and for the PRD in the South. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Multiparty competition is happening mostly in large urban areas. In this sense, 
the classical variables associated with modernization theory (industrialization, 
education, etc.) help explain electoral results for the study of Mexico's largest cities. 
This study adds two more findings to the previous literature in electoral geography. 
First, in the local contextual effect debate, the urban PRI vote is concentrating in a few 
cities in the North; this geographic finding is unique for the 2000  election. Still, the 
urban areas in the Bajio region had both a significant positive correlation with voting 
for the PAN and negative one with the PRD.  For all the parties, the model accounted 
for the spatial autocorrelation in the residuals, meaning that the model was complete 
for this purpose. This fact added to the detection of a spatial effects in some regions, 
strongly suggests the existence of contextual effects operating for the PAN, the PRI 
and the PRD.  
Second, voting behavior was not contagious for any political party. Even 
though support for the PAN and the PRD indeed diffused through the territory due to   33
their rising status of majority party in various cities, the diffusion in this period was 
not restricted by proximity to previous areas of electoral support. In brief, voting 
support in the 2000 election was unrelated to voting support in the 1994 elections in 
nearby cities. This finding suggests a process of increasing national support 
independent of the location of the voter. Equally, the vote for the PRI in 2000 was not 
geographically dependent either, meaning as well that its preference was independent 
of proximity to previous areas of support.  
Overall, the models provided a good linear fit. The regression models did not 
show autocorrelated residuals or multicollinearity problems. In particular, the absence 
of spatial autocorrelation in the regression residuals pointed out that the regression 
model was complete for explaining the spatial autocorrelation of the residuals.  
Previous studies using similar techniques have indicated that new parties 
replace old parties in contagious fashion (Flint, 1995; Lutz, 1990 and 1995); 
geographical replacement is constrained by distance. However, distance and proximity 
to urban strongholds proved not to be relevant for the replacement of the PRI by the 
PAN and PRD in the 2000 federal representative elections. What explanations for 
these spatial patterns can be found?  
In terms of theory testing, the connections among the mandated changes in the 
availability of mass media, funding for electoral campaigning, and the non-
significance of the temporal-spatial lag variable, suggest that the mass media played a 
role in spreading the electoral message of the PAN and the PRD nationwide. In fact, in   34
the 1997 elections the vote was also independent of spatial proximity to the 
strongholds of all parties.
3  Lawson (1997) commented that the 1997 electoral results 
verified that all parties are competing in virtually all regions of Mexico; elections 
reflected the persistence of regional strengths, but the 2000 elections show these are 
becoming increasingly contested across the country. 
In this regard, the PRI electoral breakdown altogether with the finding of 
increasing levels of multiparty competition across cities independent of physical 
proximity to previous areas of support (non-contagious spread), might be related to 
Blum's (1997) hypothesis of economic crisis and nationwide dissatisfaction with the 
PRI regime. Nevertheless, the link between our findings and Blum's statement is not 
empirically confirmed, and further research is required on the relationship between 
national economic conditions, public opinion on government performance, and voting 
behavior.  
In this sense, one limitation in this study is that even though diffusion variables 
and spatial regression models permit the detection of relationships among places, they 
do not uncover the mediation processes of politics and the social processes within 
places (Flint, Harrower & Edsall, 2000). Such processes are afar this analysis.  
However, this study provides sufficient evidence to accept that Mexican 
political parties may or may not effortlessly win/enter in some cities, due to the 
                                                      
3 A similar spatial lag regression analysis has been conducted for the 1997 Mexican Federal 
Representative elections. See Vilalta, Carlos (2002)   35
existence of local contextual effects. Yet, political parties are beginning to compete 
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